The Risk Alleviating Role of Interbank Market Lending in Central and Eastern European Countries by Juergen von Hagen & Valeriya Dinger
 
The Risk Alleviating Role of Interbank Market Lending in Central and Eastern 
European Countries 
Valeriya Dinger* and Jürgen von Hagen
** 
 
Preliminary. Do not quote 
This Version: February 2004 
Abstract: 
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asymmetric information and moral hazard. Assuming that large banks have monitoring costs benefits 
compared to depositors regarding the lending activities of the other banks, we show that the two-tier 
structure induces small banks to engage in less risky lending activities than small banks that finance 
themselves predominantly in the deposit market. 
We test this and related hypotheses using balance sheet data from banks in 10 EU accession candidate 
countries. This allows us to compare the financial activities of banks in countries where a two-tier 
structure prevails with those of small banks in markets where such a pattern is not observed. The 
results generally confirm the main hypothesis of the model. 
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bonn.de 1. Introduction 
The banking sectors of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries underwent 
turbulent changes during the last decade. The strongly specialized and concentrated market 
structure of the monobank system was mostly liberalized and a large number of new players 
entered the market. But still in some of the sample countries, the incumbent banks (those that 
are direct successors of the monobank system banks) managed to utilize the benefits of their 
widespread branch network and customer relations and developed a relative specialization in 
deposit raising activities thus preserving a large part of their market share in the market for 
customer deposits. On the other hand, most of the new entrant banks specialize in providing 
credit to the new emerging private sector.  
As a result of the specialization of large incumbent banks in deposit raising activities, these 
banks persistently have more funds (gathered as customer deposits) than they distribute to the 
real sector. On the other hand, the new entrant banks, specialized in lending activities, 
persistently have less customer deposits than the amount of potential projects they could 
finance. The interbank market in these countries tends to clear these inequalities between 
gathered deposits and granted loans for banks with strong specialization attitude in the one or 
the other direction. Thus, a financial intermediation system with a two-tier structure
1 emerges: 
the first tier of banks (mainly the large incumbents) gather the deposits from the public and 
transfer them through the interbank market to the second tier banks, mainly new entrants, 
which themselves provide credit to the real sector.  
This phenomenon is described by various studies concerning the CEE banking industry (e.g. 
Bonin (1998), Petrov (2000)) but also by studies on banking in developing countries (see Cole 
and Slide (1999) for the case of Indonesia).  
The purpose of the current paper is to investigate whether bank specialization and the 
resulting interbank lending are associated with interbank monitoring of the banks which 
borrow in the interbank market. Such monitoring would induce lower levels of risk 
undertaking by the interbank borrowing banks. We employ both theoretical and empirical 
tools in the analysis to provide a systematic study of the risk effects of bank specialization. 
The novelty of our study consists of combining two strands of the modern literature in the 
                                                 
1 In the current paper we use the term “two-tier” structure of the financial intermediation system with a different 
meaning than the one often used in the literature on transition, namely a banking system consisting of a central 
bank and commercial banks as separate entities. 
  2unique context of a newly emerged structure of interbank markets in transition economies, 
which differs significantly from the one observed in developed countries.  
The first strand of literature explores the relation between bank specialization and interbank 
lending. Research in this area is still limited. Most theoretical papers explain the existence of 
an interbank market as an efficient mechanism for mutual insurance among banks against 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Hellwig (1994)). Evidence 
exists that the interbank trade in the developed banking systems is mainly motivated by the 
reserve requirements imposed by the Central Bank. Banks keep certain amount of liquid funds 
for the purpose of covering Central Bank reserve requirements. But only shortly before the 
expiration of the maintenance period they realize whether they have sufficient (or even excess 
funds) or insufficient funds to cover the reserve requirements. In the former case banks will 
offer funds in the interbank market, whereas in the latter case they have to borrow interbank 
funds. Therefore, the volume of trade concentrates mainly on the days before the expiration of 
the maintenance period (Hamilton (1996)). Theoretical models (see Ho and Saunders (1985)) 
explain and empirical papers (i.e. Furfine (1999) and Hartmann et al. (2001)) present evidence 
on the phenomenon that in developed banking systems large banks tend to be net borrowers, 
and small bank – net lenders.  
Only few studies suggest that the pattern of interbank trade could be determined by long-term 
specialization rather than short-term liquidity insurance (Berger et al (1993) and Manzano and 
Galmes (1995)). Banks may participate in the interbank trading of funds, because, due to 
specialization in deposit raising or credit granting they have systematic excess supply of or 
demand for funds. A bank specialized in deposit raising activities but with underdeveloped 
credit activities will systematically have excess idle funds that could be channelled to other 
banks. This indicates the possibility that the interbank market may not only provide a 
covering of short-term liquidity needs but also fulfil clearing functions in cases of systematic 
specialization. Apart from the descriptive literature, there does not exist much theory dealing 
with this type of bank specialization. Calveras (2001) represents one of the few theoretical 
works on the topic. He builds a theoretical model explaining how different interbank settings 
affect the strategies of banks to specialize, and in which activity (deposit raising or credit 
granting). Unfortunately, there exists no systematic study of the magnitude of the 
phenomenon of specialization in credit or deposit activities and its impact on the interbank 
market. 
  3The second strand of literature explores the relation between interbank lending and peer 
monitoring. In a seminal paper, Rochet and Tirole (1996) develop a model of interbank 
lending where the existence of interbank exposures generates incentives for interbank 
monitoring. These authors examine the trade-off between the risk alleviating effects of peer 
monitoring and the risk aggravating effects caused by the increase in systemic risk due to 
increased linkages between banks. They compare a centralized
2 and a decentralized transfer of 
funds system and conclude that the decentralized operation of interbank lending must be 
motivated by peer monitoring and is only optimal, if banks are better suited to acquire and 
interpret information about each other than the regulatory authorities. In Rochet and Tirole’s 
context, the  incentives for monitoring of interbank borrowers are reduced by the implicit 
insurance of interbank claims that most governments de facto provide by their readiness to 
rescue distressed borrowing banks. The problem is that, even if interbank-lending banks are 
suited to accumulate and assess information about interbank-borrowing banks’ projects, they 
will not perform proper interbank monitoring as far as the government in its attempts to 
minimize systemic risk is likely to bail-out distressed interbank-borrowing banks (thus 
providing implicit guarantee on interbank deposits). 
The theory we introduce below differs from Rochet and Tirole’s (1996) in the sense that we 
analyse markets where bailing-out distressed interbank borrowing banks in order to prevent 
systemic risk is less likely than in the context described by Rochet and Tirole (1996) and thus 
interbank monitoring is not hampered by moral hazard issues. Rochet and Tirole focus on a 
situation where lending banks have weak incentives to monitor their interbank borrowers, 
since they expect the government to bail out the borrower in case of distress in order to reduce 
systemic risk. The government will be “forced” to bail out distressed banks because 
borrowing banks are usually relative large institutions with a large number of lenders and a 
default of a borrowing bank will generate losses in a large number of other banks (too-big-to-
fail doctrine). In the situation we observe in the CEE countries with two-tier financial 
intermediation system, governments experience lower pressure of bailing-out interbank 
borrowing banks, because the latter are typically small institutions which mainly borrow from 
one lending bank and the amount of borrowing is small relative to lending bank’s assets. 
Therefore, the risk of contagion of the whole system is reduced and authorities are less likely 
to interfere. This implies that lending banks have to provide monitoring themselves in order to 
reduce shirking by the borrowing banks.  
                                                 
2 A system in which the Central bank acts as a counterparty and guarantees the finality of payments. 
  4In this settings our model shows that a new entrant bank that finances itself through the 
interbank market should have a risk level that is not higher than that of a new entrant bank 
that fully finances itself through customer deposits. The reason is that a bank financed 
through the interbank market will be monitored because for large creditors (in this case the 
large incumbent banks) the costs of monitoring are justified by the benefits of the lower risk 
of the borrower, whereas the bank fully financed by customer deposits will not be monitored 
as monitoring costs are high relative to amounts of individual deposits. 
The empirical part consist of two steps. First, we provide empirical evidence on the transfer of 
funds from the large banks to the rest of the banking system and determine in which of the 
sample countries
3 this phenomenon is of significant magnitude. Second, we empirically test 
the hypotheses of the theoretical model. The analysis is based on financial statements data 
from banks in 10 EU accession candidate countries for the period 1994-2001. The empirical 
evidence on different levels of risk provides clues for policy recommendations. If a two-tier 
structure mitigates risk, measures supporting bank specialization (e.g. deregulation of the 
interbank market) may be appropriate. 
The paper is organised as following. The theoretical model is presented in section 2. Section 3 
presents the data sources. Section 4 explains the two-tier financial intermediation system in 
detail, and proposes variables quantifying the two-tier financial intermediation phenomenon. 
Section 5 present the econometric models for the comparison of banks’ risk characteristics 
and the results of the estimations, and section 6 concludes.  
                                                 
3 The sample consists of ten CEE countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
  52. Risk implications of bank specialization: a model 
The following section concentrates on the implications of the existence of a two-tier system 
on the level of bank risk.  
We introduce a model where monitoring of a bank is necessary as a prevention from a credit 
market collapse but is too costly to be performed by the individual depositors. In this situation 
the monitoring function can be performed by large banking institutions which lend funds to 
smaller banks and have cost advantage (due to economies of scale) in providing monitoring of 
the credit activities of the banks borrowing funds from them. The model aims at a comparison 
of the level of risk undertaking of banks which fully finance their activities through customer 
deposits and banks which finance substantial part of their projects through interbank 
borrowing. 
The model is based on the following assumptions
4,: 
A1. There are exist two types of entrepreneurs: one with a “good” project and one with a 
“bad” project. Both projects require an investment of size 1. Table 1 illustrates the probability 
of success and the returns of the projects. 
Table 1: Returns of good and bad projects 
“Good” Project  Good state of the world  Bad state of the world 
Probability  ΠG
  1- ΠG 
Return G  0 
 
“Bad” Project  Good state of the world  Bad state of the world 
Probability  ΠB
  1- ΠG 
Return B  0 
                                                 
4 The model is an extended version of a simple model of credit market with moral hazard, based on Freixas and 
Rochet (1999) 
  6The return of a “good” project is G with probability ΠG (in case of success) or 0 otherwise, 
the return of a “bad” project is B with probability ΠB and 0 otherwise. “Good” projects have a 
positive net present value, whereas “bad” projects have a negative net present value:   
G ΠG – 1 > 0 > B ΠB  –   1         ( 1 )  
  G < B 
  ΠG > ΠB 
A2. The population of banks consists of two types of institutions:  
-  large banks, which are considered to have implicit or explicit guarantee by 
the government (e.g. due to too-big-to-fail considerations or historical 
reasons). Deposit rates with these banks (ilb) equal the riskless interest rate, 
considered for simplicity 0. A large bank should repay to depositors the 
amount of Dlb = 1 + ilb = 1 (the rate of repayment to the depositors Dlb for a 
deposited amount of 1 is equal to 1);  
-  and small banks
5 – banking institutions with non-diversified portfolio and 
without government protection. Deposits with small banks are considered to 
be risky, interest rates on customer deposits with these banks are higher than 
the ones on customer deposits with large banks. Denote by isb small banks’ 
interest rate on customer deposits, isb  >  ilb. To simplify the further 
computation we prefer to work with the amounts of repayment. We denote by 
D the amount a bank should repay to its depositors for a deposit in volume of 
1 (D = 1 + isb, where isb denotes small banks’ interest rate on customer 
deposits).  
A3. Both entrepreneurs and banks have limited liability and are risk neutral 
A4. The large banks develop a specialization in deposit gathering activities: the volume of 
customer deposits they raise is higher than the volume of loans they grant to entrepreneurs 
(the difference between gathered deposits and granted loans is called idle funds). Depending 
                                                 
5 Here as in the rest of the text we call the new entrant banks “small”. Clearly a lot of new entrant institutions 
managed to develop themselves into medium-sized or large banks, but in all of the sample countries where a 
two-tier financial intermediation system exists, we observe that the major deposit taking institutions are 
incumbent banks. So, the distinction “small”-“large” is conditional on the role of the respective bank on the 
deposit gathering market. 
  7on its volume of idle funds; a large bank offers a small bank an interbank deposit of α (0 < α ≤ 
1). The repayment that the large bank requires for such an interbank deposits is denoted by d 
(d = 1 + iib, where isb  denotes the interest rate on the interbank deposit). Therefore, the small 
bank should repay αd for an interbank deposits of α.  
A5. Small banks have total size of the deposits equal to unity (so α is the share of interbank 
deposits in the total liabilities of the small bank), and they grant a loan to one entrepreneur of 
total volume of 1 (finance one project). The banks can observe the type of the entrepreneur 
and set the respective repayment rates RG and RB. The expected return of a loan for a “bad” 
project is negative, whereas the one for a “good” project is positive: 
RG ΠG – 1 > 0 > RB ΠB  –   1          ( 2 )  
RB > RG 
A6. Customer depositors deposit small amounts, so that n depositors (n → ∞) are needed to 
raise total deposits of size 1, each depositor invests 1/n. 
Let us at this point illustrate the possibility that a bank could have an incentive to finance an 
investment in a “bad” project, despite of its knowledge of the project’s negative net present 
value: 
Denote by R the repayment a bank owes to its creditors (R = D if the bank is fully financed by 
customer deposits and R = αd + (1- α)D if the bank is partly financed by customer deposits 
and partly by an interbank deposit).  
The bank will choose to invest in the “good” project if and only if the expected net return 
form a “good” project is not lower than the one from a “bad” project. Therefore, the bank will 
invest in a good project if and only if: 
ΠG (RG – R) ≥ ΠB (RB – R)   ΠG RG - ΠB RB ≥ R (ΠG - ΠB) 
  R ≤ (ΠG RG - ΠB RB)/(ΠG - ΠB),      (3) 
Denote (ΠG RG - ΠB RB)/(ΠG - ΠB) = RC. Then RC is a critical value of the repayment above 
which the bank will choose to invest in a “bad” project. That is, a bank will invest in a good 
project is and only if: 
 R  ≤ RC          ( 3 ’ )  
  8If RC < 1 small banks have incentive to invest in “bad” projects for every feasible repayment 
rate and the credit market collapses, therefore we assume that RC ≥ 1, for now on.  
If small banks are fully financed with customer deposits, a competitive equilibrium on the 
market for deposits in small banks requires that the expected repayment to depositors should 
equal the amount deposited. That is  
D ΠD  =   1           ( 4 )    
where ΠD denotes the probability of repayment to the depositors: 
 
 
The following two cases have to be considered: 
   ΠG if D ≤ RC, and the bank invests in a “good” project 
ΠD  =             
   ΠB if D > RC, and the bank invests in a “bad” project. 
A.  ΠGRC ≥ 1 (moral hazard is not too strong) 
In this case there exists D such that D ≤ RC and ΠG D = 1. There exist equilibrium on the 
market for deposits in small banks in which small banks invest in good projects. 
B.  ΠGRC < 1 (strong moral hazard issue) 
If D > RC the bad project will be financed and the repayment probability is ΠB, but DΠB < 
RBΠB < 1. On the other hand if D ≤ RC , then the repayment probability is ΠG but  ΠGD ≤  
                                                
ΠGRC < 1. Therefore, in this case, there exist no repayment rate on customer deposits D which 
fulfils the equality DΠD = 1. Therefore, in the absence of monitoring the credit market will 
collapse as depositors realize losses in expectations. Further on in the model we will 
concentrate on this case. 
A7. Let us introduce now a monitoring technology. At cost M > 0 the creditors of a small 
bank can screen the type of the project and introduce different interest rates according to the 
type of the project and if only good projects are preferred by the small banks creditors they 
can enforce investment in a “good” project
6.  
 
6 We adopt the broad concept of monitoring introduced in Hellwig (1991), according to which monitoring 
includes: 
   screening of projects (a priori) 
   preventing opportunistic behaviour of the borrower during the realisation of the project (moral 
hazard) 
  9It is obvious that retail depositors prefer investment in a good project, otherwise they will 
realize loss in expectations. Furthermore, under the assumption of low deposit rates of large 
banks we can prove that the large banks are only interested in investing in “good” projects. 
This result is formalized in Proposition 1.  
Proposition 1: If D < RC large banks will realize higher net returns if they provide interbank 
deposits only to small banks which invest in “good” projects.  
Proof: See Appendix 
In order for monitoring to take place the monitoring cost M should be lower than the benefits 
of it. Therefore, monitoring by customer depositors is impossible (if n → ∞, 1/n(ΠGD - ΠBD) 
< M).  
On the other hand, the large bank as creditor of the small bank will monitor if and only if the 
benefit of monitoring, that is the difference of the expected repayments is not lower than the 
monitoring costs, from which it follows that: 
  αd(ΠG – ΠB) ≥  M 
  α ≥ M/d( ΠG – ΠB) = αmc        ( 5 )    
Note, furthermore, that since monitoring is costly, customer depositors are not able to 
distinguish whether a small bank is borrowing on the interbank market and is thus been 
monitored by the lending bank or not. As a consequence depositors require an uniform 
repayment rate on their deposits from all small banks irrespective of the fact that some of 
them get financing from large banks which monitor them and thus undertake less risky 
projects. 
Let us illustrate the problems of the large and the small bank in order to derive the possible 
equilibria.  
The problem of the large bank: 
If α ≥ M/( ΠG*d – ΠB*d) = αmc then the large bank will lend the small bank a monitored 
interbank loan forcing it to invest prudently.  
                                                                                                                                                          
   punishing or auditing a borrower who fails to meet contractual obligations. 
  10If α < αmc (the volume of idle funds is too low or the monitoring costs are too high), the large 
bank reckons with opportunistic behaviour of the small bank and will prefer not to provide the 
interbank loan.  
The problem of the small bank: 
If ΠGRC < 1, then 1/ΠG > RC , but D ≥ 1/ ΠG (otherwise depositors will anticipate the expected 
loss) from which it follows that D > RC and in absence of interbank financing/monitoring each 
small bank will misbehave.  
D > RC implies  the following alternatives for the small bank:  
(i) to fully finance itself through customer deposits. In this case it has the possibility to 
invest in a “bad” project. The expected net return of the small bank is given by the 
expected loan return minus the due repayment to depositors (as the small banks has 
limited liability the repayment is equal to 0 if the project fails). Formally the net 
expected return in this case is expressed as: 
ΠB(RB  –   D )             ( 6 )  
(ii) to accept an interbank deposit. In this case its behaviour is monitored and the bank 
should invest in a “good” project. The expected net return of the bank is equal to the 
expected loan return minus the due repayment to customer and interbank depositors 
(again due to limited liability the repayment to depositors is equal to 0 if the project 
fails). Formally the net expected return is expressed as: 
ΠG(RG -  αd - (1- α) D )        ( 7 )  
The small bank will prefer to accept the interbank loan under the condition of monitoring if 
and only if the net expected return from alternative (i) is higher than the one from alternative 
(ii), that is if (7) is higher then (6): 
  ΠG(RG -  αd - (1- α)D) > ΠB(RB – D), from which follows 
  α > (ΠB(RB – D) – ΠG(RG – D))/ (ΠG (D – d)) = αlc       (8) 
If  D > RC the bank would have incentives to invest in the bad project, but it could invest in 
the good one if it has the possibility to receive a monitored interbank loan that is large enough 
(α is high). Notice that if  D > RC => ΠB*(RB – D) – ΠG*(RG – D) > 0 and αlc > 0. The critical 
  11value of α is determined by the difference of expected return from a bad and a good project 
and by the difference of the repayments on customer relative to interbank deposits. 
Therefore, interbank lending will occur in equilibrium if and only if α ≥ max(αmc , αlc ). 
What remains to be proven is the existence of equilibrium of the market for customer deposits 
in small banks under conditions (i) ΠG R C  < 1 and (ii) a proportion of small banks are 
monitored. We have to prove that there exist an equilibrium repayment rate on customer 
deposits in small banks D, such that DΠD =1 for the population of small banks as a whole 
(pooling together “monitored” and “unmonitored” small banks as individual depositors are 
not able to distinguish among them and charge an uniform repayment rate). 
Denote by m the number of small banks in the economy and by β the proportion of those of 
them which receive interbank financing and are thus monitored. The amount deposited by 
customer depositors in the monitored banks equals (1-γ)βm, where γ = (Σαi )/m (i = 1, 2, …, 
m, αi = 0 if the small bank is not financed on the interbank market) denotes the average 
amount of interbank deposits. The amount deposited by customer depositors in banks which 
are not monitored equals (1- β)m. The expected repayments are expressed by (1-γ)βmΠGD 
and (1- β)mΠBD respectively. Existence of competitive equilibrium for the population of 
small banks requires that the sum of expected repayments equal the amounts deposited, that 
is:  
(1-γ)βmΠGD + (1- β)mΠBD = (1-γ)βm + (1- β)m, from which follows: 
D = (1-γβ)/((1-γ)βΠG + (1-β)ΠB)       (10) 
Furthermore, as β belongs to the interval (0, 1] and γ belongs to the interval (0,1), D belongs 
to the interval [1/ΠG, 1/ ΠB]. Therefore, for all feasible β and γ there exists a deposit rate D for 
which a competitive equilibrium in the market for customer deposits in small banks exists. If  
β =1 (all the small banks get interbank financing and are therefore monitored), then D = 1/ΠG 
(all financed projects are good). β = 0 is not a feasible option as it means none of the small 
banks is monitored, therefore they all finance a bad project and the credit market collapses. 
The analysis above proved the existence of an equilibrium of the market for customer deposits 
in small banks if assumption A8 holds, that is if customer depositors are not able to 
distinguish among small banks (monitored or not) and charge an uniform interest rate on their 
  12deposits. Let us now consider the situation where depositors are able to observe whether a 
small bank is financed through interbank deposits or not and are aware that interbank 
financing implies monitoring and thus less risk. Let us impose the following alternative to 
assumption A8. 
A8’. Customer depositors in small banks are able to observe at no cost whether a small bank 
borrows on the interbank market or not and require different repayment rates on their deposits 
accordingly.  
Let us denote by Dlow the repayment rate on deposits in small banks which borrow on the 
interbank market and by Dhigh the repayment rate on deposits in small banks which do not  
borrow on the interbank market. If individual depositors are able to distinguish among those 
two types of small banks then both equilibrium  Dlow and  Dhigh should exist. 
Equilibrium Dhigh should fulfil the following two conditions: 
  - small banks without interbank financing have non-negative expected return: 
ΠB(RB - Dhigh) ≥  0            ( 1 1 )  
(11) implies that Dhigh ≤ RB,  but RB < 1/ΠB (see (1)) therefore Dhigh ≤ RB < 1/ΠB. 
  - individual depositors in small banks which are not monitored should become 
expected repayment which is in expectation equal to the amount deposited, that is: 
ΠB Dhigh  =   1             ( 1 2 )  
and therefore Dhigh = 1/ ΠB       
(11) and (12) cannot hold simultaneously, which implies that if customer depositors are able 
to distinguish between monitored and unmonitored banks there exists no equilibrium deposits 
rate for deposits in small banks which do not receive interbank financing.  
To recapitulate, in the case of low moral hazard issue (ΠGRC ≥ 1) the type of financing does 
not have an impact on the choice of the project which will be financed by the small bank: an 
equilibrium deposit rate exists such that both banks and customer depositors make no losses 
in expectation and financing a project with positive net present value is always more 
profitable for the bank than financing a project with negative net present value. On the other 
hand, in the case of strong moral hazard issue (ΠGRC  < 1), an equilibrium on the market for 
  13customer deposits is only possible if a monitoring technology is introduced and some of the 
small banks are monitored. Crucial assumption for the existence of such an equilibrium is  the 
one that individual depositors cannot distinguish between monitored and unmonitored small 
banks. In this case, whether a bank will invest in a “good” or a “bad” project depends on the 
whether it is financed by customer or by interbank deposits. The small bank will have lower 
risk level if it receives an interbank deposit from a large bank. The volume of the interbank 
deposit should by sufficiently large as compared to the monitoring costs.  
That is how the theory of asymmetric information could be employed for the explanation of 
why only few banks gather the deposits from the public. Namely, these banks could be 
understood as monitors of the small banks.  
In the empirical part of the paper we compare different measures of bank’s risk and try to 
answer the questions: are the small banks that are financed through the interbank market less 
risky; does a two-tier financial intermediation system means lower risk level of all the small 
banks (this is to test the hypothesis of a spill-over effect of the monitoring of some of the 
banks over the whole population of small banks) and do small banks, borrowing on the 
interbank market in a two-tier financial intermediation system, undertake less risky projects 
than the rest of the sample small banks. 
  143. The data  
The sample covers banking institutions from ten CEE countries: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. For 
the macro level variables we use data provided by IMF in the International Financial 
Statistics. The variables we use on the micro level stem from banks balance sheet, the data is 
provided by BankScope
7.Our sample includes 296 banks, of which 28 Bulgarian, 35 Czech, 
12 Estonian, 36 Hungarian, 28 Latvian, 14 Lithuanian, 56 Polish, 34 Romanian, 24 Slovakian, 
and 29 Slovenian. In each of the sample countries, BankScope covers between 70-90% of the 
banks (calculated as percentage of banking assets). Table 2 presents the coverage of the 
BankScope per country and year. All large and medium-sized banks are covered. The banks 
not covered by the BankScope are minor banking institutions.  
Due to data availability we restrict the analysis to the period 1994-2001, so we have 
observations of eight years. Data for some of the banks are available in only some of the 
years, which results in an unbalanced panel dataset.  
Table 2: Number of banks in the sample and the share of the total banking system they represent 
 
                                                 
. 7 7
number of banks included
represented share of the 
total banking assets number of banks included
represented share of the 
total banking assets
Bulgaria 11 0.83 22 0.90
Czech Republic 24 0.81 22 0.84
Estonia 8 0.77 3 0.82
Hungary 25 0.84 27 0.98
Latvia 15 0.68 19 0.90
Lithuania 7 0.78 8 0.81
Poland 35 0.73 29 0.72
Romania 50 . 7 0 2 40
Slovakia 10 0.71 15 0.81
Slovenia 14 0.84 16 0.96
1994 2001
  15
7 BankScope is a database created by IBCA and Bureau van Dijk 4.  The two-tier financial intermediation system 
In this section we will present a description of the factors that have caused a strong 
specialization of banks in some of the CEE countries and an approach of distinguishing 
among systems with one- and with two-tier financial intermediation. Such a distinction is 
based on the volume of funds transferred from banks dominating the deposit market to the 
rest of the banks. The task is to present quantity measures for the degree to which major 
deposit gathering institutions transfer funds to the rest of the system, thus indicating 
underdevelopment of their lending activities and a relative specialization in deposit gathering. 
Two major features of banking sector development in CEE determine the phenomenon of 
bank specialization and the emergence of two-tier financial intermediation systems.  
1.  Incumbent banks still have privileged access to the market of customer deposits  
The historical argument is strongly presented in the literature (Anderson and Kegels, 1998 
and Miller and Petranov, 2001). Its arguments concentrate on the inertia in the bank-customer 
relationships. Even if nowadays a lot of new entrant banks exist, people still prefer depositing 
in the incumbent banks, because they are used to. Incumbent banks are the ones that already 
have developed branch network and expertise in retail banking.  
Another argument is that the public assigns more trust to the former state-owned banks as it is 
persuaded in the too-big-to-fail doctrine: the government will not let the largest (to higher or 
lower extend still state-owned) banks fail and will intervene in case of distress. This argument 
has especially strong impact for the early transition period when these were the only banks 
enjoying deposit guarantees. So in this period new entrant banks had to offer higher deposit 
rates than the incumbent banks in order to attract deposits. Starting in 1994 most of the CEE 
countries introduced deposits insurance schemes but their public confidence is limited (see 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998), so the too-big-to-fail doctrine continues to play a role 
for the depositors.  
2.  Large incumbent banks are very inactive on the market for credits for private 
If the large banks are able to gather deposits with lower interest rate than the new entrant 
banks one may assume that these bank will also have comparative advantage in credit 
allocation, but the reality supports the opposite situation. Often presented argument in the 
literature (see again Anderson and Kegels (1998) and Miller and Petranov (2001))  is that 
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allocation activities and state-of-the-art market orientation. Similar arguments are often 
represented in the literature on banking in developing countries (see Slide and Cole (1999)). 
Another reason could be the fact that for a private enterprise receiving a credit from a large 
bureaucratic banking institution is associated with bearing some extra costs beyond the 
interest rate paid. Typically such costs would include time spent in a bureaucratic credit 
approval procedure, but in extreme case it could also include bribery, etc.  
The rest of the section concentrates on providing empirical measures for the existing of two-
tier financial intermediation. As an initial indicator for the existence of a two-tier financial 
intermediation system we will use the existence of an “inverse” correlation between the size 
of a bank and its interbank position (inverse is understood as the opposite of the pattern 
observed in the developed countries). When large banks have statistically significant more net 
interbank assets than small banks it is an indication that larger banks have relative to small 
banks higher amount of the difference between the amounts of customer deposits they gather 
and the amounts of credits they grant and securities they hold. Such a relationship indicates 
that large banks are more likely to be specialized in deposit raising. Table 3 presents the sign 
of the correlations between interbank ratio (expressed as the ratio between bank’s interbank 
assets and bank’s interbank liabilities
8) and bank size (proxied by total assets of the bank). 









1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria - +** + + +* +* +*** +**
ech Republic +*** +*** + - + +** +*** +***
tonia ----- * ---
Hungary + - +*** +* +* - +*** +**
tvia +++- - - - -
Lithuania + + +* +* - + + -
Poland +*** +*** +*** +* +** +*** +*** +
mania ---+ ----
Slovakia +** +** +** +** - +* +* -
ovenia --------
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
                                                 
8 The format of balance sheet used by BankScope determines interbank assets as “deposits with banks” – an 
entry in the “other earning assets” section of the assets side and interbank liabilities as “banks deposits” – an 
entry in the “deposits” section of the liabilities side (see Figure A1 in the Appendix for the structure of the 
balance sheet as presented by BankScope). 
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Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia show positive correlations for 
almost all observed years. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for most of 
the years this correlations are also significant. On the other hand only in Estonia and Slovenia 
we observe persistent negative correlation between interbank ratios and banks’ size. 
The interbank positions by themselves are not enough to argue that a two-tier banking system 
exists, as it could be the case that the large banks have better liquidity positions and therefore 
are less probable to need funds to cover short term liquidity needs. In addition, we should 
rather prove that the magnitude of the funds channelled from the large to the small banks is 
substantially large.  
We will analyse the magnitude of the interbank funds channelling using two variables 
measuring the transfer of funds from large to small banks. The first variable is the ratio 
NIAlb/CDlb, where NIA denotes net interbank assets, (calculated as the difference between 
deposits with banks and deposits from banks (equals the net position of the bank on the 
interbank market), CD denotes customer deposits and the subscript lb stands for large banks. 
This ratio (NIAlb/CDlb),  which we call large banks’ lending, is intuitionally at closest to the 
phenomenon we study and represents the share of deposits of the large banks that are further 
channelled to other banks. If this ratio is positive then large banks are net lenders on the 
interbank market, a negative value of the ratio is a result of negative net interbank assets and 
means that the large banks borrow funds on the interbank market. 
The measure given by the value of large banks’ lending can be misleading for the existence of 
a two-tier structure of the financial intermediation. The existence of high NIAlb/CDlb ratio 
alone is not sufficient as it could be the case that large banks have a large proportion of 
customer deposits that they channel to other banks, but it’s not necessary that these borrower 
banks are domestic institutions
9. Such a situation has other implications that go beyond the 
scope of this study.  
That is why, we are also interested in another variable that we call small banks’ borrowing, 
expressed by the net interbank position of the small banks relative to their loans as an 
                                                 
9 As capital account regulations have been progressively relaxed in the past several years banks have the 
possibility to deposit money with foreign banking institutions and to receive deposits from foreign banks. What 
we observe in practice is that CEE banks deposit money with foreign banking institutions, but are seldom 
recipients of funds. The reason is that foreign banks restrain from depositing in CEE banks due to lack of 
information and appropriate credit ratings. 
  18indicator of how much of the funds that small banks allocate to credits is financed through the 
interbank market. The ratio NIAsb/Lsb (where NIA denote net interbank assets again, L 
denotes loans and the subscript sb stands for small banks) is used as an indicator of whether 
small banks rely on funds gathered on the interbank market (this will imply a negative sign of 
the ratio) for the financing of their loan supply. We use loans as a denominator because we 
are ultimately interested in the financial intermediation chain “savers – entrepreneurs”. 
Positive level (or negative but small in absolute value) of the ratio would mean that the small 
banks have their own sources of funds for the loans they distribute. High absolute value 
negative ratio results from relative strong reliance of the small banks on the funds from other 
banks. It is also important to mention that if a bank has a low level of loans to total assets then 
the ratio NIAsb/Lsb will have higher absolute value indicating a lower importance of the 
interbank market funds for a bank. This implication is only correct in the frame of the analysis 
we follow here, namely when we are interested only in the credit activity of the bank and not 
in the investment in securities (for the structure of the balance sheet used in the analysis see 
Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
The construction of the above variables is clearly influenced by the distinction between large 
and small banks. We choose to treat as large banks those institutions, each of which gathers at 
least 20% of the total amount of customer deposits in the respective banking system
10. All the 
banks which are not defined as large become the status of small banks, so we do not introduce 
a medium size category. 
The values of the transfer of funds variables per country and year are presented in Table 4 and 
Table 5. 








1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
ulgaria n.a. 0.17 -0.50 0.29 0.47 0.44 0.66 0.49
Czech Republic 0.20 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.34 0.53 0.51
Estonia 0.29 0.20 0.00 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.05 0.06
ngary 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.17
Latvia 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.09 -0.11 0.00 0.07 -0.09
Lithuania 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.09
land 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12
ania 0.60 0.35 -0.27 -0.61 0.08 -0.07 0.07 0.06
Slovakia 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.17
venia -0.21 0.26 0.24 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope and IFS 
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10 The banks that have at least 20% share in the respective deposit market and year are listed in Table A2 in the 
Appendix  








1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria -0.66 -0.24 1.60 1.03 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.66
Czech Republic -0.38 -0.33 -0.31 -0.22 -0.09 -0.04 0.05 -0.12
stonia 0.43 0.10 0.03 -0.16 -0.25 -0.09 0.22 0.07
ngary -0.42 -0.26 -0.17 -0.25 -0.17 -0.11 -0.12 -0.07
Latvia 0.50 1.10 1.56 1.02 0.16 0.38 1.08 0.83
thuania -0.10 -0.17 0.04 0.27 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.00
land 0.05 -0.11 -0.19 -0.08 -0.19 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06
Romania 0.37 0.18 0.11 0.52 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.37
Slovakia -0.41 -0.34 -0.29 -0.36 -0.30 -0.32 0.00 -0.01
venia 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.05
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope and IFS 
Table A3 in the Appendix presents the correlation coefficient between the transfer of funds 
variables (NIAlb/CDlb and NIAsb/Lsb). The degree of correlation differs substantially across 
the sample countries and the correlation in the whole sample is very low, providing further 
evidence that the net interbank assets of large banks alone are not a sufficient description of 
the phenomenon we study. 
As depicted in Table 4 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have 
persistently high positive values of “large banks’ lending”, whereas Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovenia have very low (mostly negative) values of this variable. The values for Estonia and 
Latvia vary a lot across the years. The countries with high value of the large banks’ net 
interbank assets variable are all countries with strong incumbent banks, whereas the countries 
where we observe low value of this variable are countries where no incumbent banks exist 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are newly independent countries which have not 
inherited institutions from pre-transition time; Romanian incumbent banks lost customer 
confidence in the early transition period when the first periods of distress were observed, later 
on one of the major incumbent banks went insolvent).   
Concerning the variable measuring the interbank position of the small banks Bulgaria (after 
1995), Estonia (for most of the observed periods), Latvia, Lithuania (to a lower extend), 
Romania and Slovenia show high values which indicate that small banks do not depend in 
their credit activity on funds gathered on the interbank market. On the other hand, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia show very low values of this variable (even below    
-30% in the early years) which indicates that in these countries a large proportion of the small 
(new entrant banks) heavily depend on funds form the interbank market for the financing of 
their credit activities. 
  20What are the appropriate values of the variables measuring interbank transfer of funds in 
order to assume the existence of a two-tier structure of the financial intermediation? We 
assume that as the central bank reserve requirements in most of the CEE countries are in the 
range of 2-8% of eligible deposits, a ratio of net interbank assets to customer deposits or to 
loans higher than 8% could hardly be caused by short term liquidity support connected with 
the central bank reserve requirements and indicates that specialization in deposit raising/credit 
allocating stays behind the interbank positions. Therefore, we could define the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as countries with a two-tier financial inetrmediation 
systems. 
To sum up in all the countries where incumbent banks still have dominant position in the 
market for customer deposits (except Bulgaria) we observe the phenomenon of significant 
transfer of funds through the interbank market from the incumbent banks to the rest of the 
banking sector. In the countries where due to historical reasons no incumbent banks exist or 
they lost customers’ confidence in the early transition, banks dominating the deposit market 
do not channel significant amounts of funds to the rest of the banking system. In some of the 
sample countries we even observe the contrary case where large banks are net receivers of 
funds but the magnitude of this transfer is much lower and could be associated with the 
classical motivation of interbank borrowing, namely covering of short term liquidity. 
It is important to mention that the countries defined by the variables measuring the magnitude 
of transfer of funds as two-tier financial intermediation systems are exactly the ones that have 
positive significant correlations between interbank ratios and total banking assets discussed 
above. Bulgaria is an interesting exception proving the necessity to involve those variables 
but not only the sign of the correlations in the distinguishing among the countries. Bulgaria 
shows positive (mostly significant) correlations between interbank ratio and banks’ size, but 
could not be defined as a two-tier financial intermediation system according to the variables 
measuring interbank transfer of funds. The reason is that almost all Bulgarian banks have 
positive net interbank assets. It is an indication that Bulgarian banks trade not only among 
themselves, but in general they have net positive positions against foreign banks. The 
speculations about the reasons of this outflow of deposits are beyond the scope of this paper
11. 
 
                                                 
11 For a detailed discussion see Hristov (2002). ECB (2002) mentions the scarcity of good domestic lending 
opportunities as a determinant of the large foreign investments of Bulgarian banks. 
  215.  Comparison of banks risk characteristics: empirical evidence 
In the following section we test whether the banks’ net positions in the interbank market and 
the type of the banking system they operate in (two-tier or classical intermediation) cause 
significant differences in bank levels of risk undertaking.  
The purpose is to empirically test two basis hypotheses. The first hypothesis is directly 
derived from the theoretical model and states that banks, which borrow on the interbank 
market finance projects with lower risk levels than the ones that are fully financed by 
customer deposits. This would imply that the interbank-lending banks engage in interbank 
monitoring. 
The second hypothesis tests for the average risk alleviating effects of a two-tier banking 
system structure. It states that a two-tier structure of the banking system in which the banks 
dominating the deposit market channel a large proportion of the funds gathered to smaller 
banking institutions implies lower risk on average for the whole population of small (non-
dominating the deposit market) banks. If a two-tier structure, in the way we define it in this 
paper, implies lower risk levels of the small banks, this will indicate that it does matter 
whether banks are financed by funds provided by single large interbank-depositor or by 
numerous small interbank-depositors or retail depositors. 
5.1. Econometric models 
We use the following two econometric models to test the first and the second hypotheses, 
respectively. Model (11) is used to test the hypothesis of the risk effects of interbank 
borrowing. Model (12) is used to test the impact of a two-tier structure of the financial 
intermediation on the level of risk of small banks. 
BRijt = β1 + β2*NIPijt + β3*Xijt + β4*Yjt + β5*Cj + β6*Tt + εijt,       (13) 
BRijt = β1 + β2*TSjt + β3*Xijt + β4*Yjt + β5*Cj + β6*Tt + εijt,      (14) 
where: 
BRijt denotes the level of risk undertaking of bank i in country j in time t; 
NIPijt denotes the net interbank position of bank i in country j in time t; 
  22TSjt is the vector of variables describing the type of the financial intermediation system (two-
tier or one-tier); 
Xijt is a vector of control variables on the individual bank level; 
Yjt  is a vector of control variables on the level of country of operations, and 
εijt is the error term. 
We perform the regressions on a sample consisting only of the banks that are regarded as 
small by the construction of the transfer of funds variables. We exclude from the sample the 
banks defined as large, since the relation between interbank borrowing and interbank 
monitoring could be different for large banks. If large banks heavily borrow in the interbank 
market they do so from a large number of lender banks and free rider and too-bog-to-fail 
concerns may hamper the lending banks’ incentives to monitor the large borrowing bank.  
Dependent variable 
Key problem for a comparison of levels of bank risk undertaking is the choice of variables 
used as measures for banks risk undertaking (BRijt). In the current paper we focus on four 
such variables that have widely been used in the literature
12: loan loss reserves to gross loans 
(LLR), loan loss provisions to gross loans, non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL) and 
net-charge offs to gross loans (NCO).  
The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans expresses what proportion of the total loan 
portfolio has been provided for but not charged-off. Loan loss reserves are an entry on the 
liability side of the balance sheet and represent accumulated provisions for expected loan 
losses. Assuming similar accounting policy and regulations of provisioning, higher LLR ratio 
would imply that banks expect losses on higher proportion of their loans and is thus an 
indicator for riskier loan portfolio of the bank
13.  
Loan loss provisions are expenses against current earnings in the profit and loss account. 
They represent allocations in the current period to the loan loss reserves and should reflect 
estimated losses for specifically identified loans as well as estimated probable credit losses 
inherent in the remainder of the portfolio at the balance sheet date
14. Again, assuming similar 
                                                 
12 See Martin (1977) and Gonzales-Hermosillo, et al (1996) 
13 Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) 
14 Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) 
  23accounting policy and regulations of provisioning, higher LLP ratio implies riskier loan 
portfolio. 
Non-performing loans to gross loans represent the proportion of impaired (doubtful) loans in 
the loan portfolio
15. A high value of this ratio indicates that a large proportion of a bank’s 
loans have not been served according to the repayment schedule. Thus, it suggests that a high 
proportion of bank debtors may default on their loans. 
The ratio of net charge-offs to gross loans (NCO) illustrates the proportion of written-off loan 
losses
16 in the amount of the gross loan portfolio. The lower the NCO ratio, the lower the 
level of risk undertaking of a bank as long as the write-off policies are consistent across 
comparable banks. Since charge-offs illustrated in current financial statements reflect the risk 
of loans distributed in previous balance periods, we use as dependent variables the values of 
the NCO ratio for one year ahead (one-year lead NCO). In other words, we regress the values 
of the NCO ratio in period t on the lagged values of the explanatory variables (from periods t-
1).  
Following Demsetz (1996) we prefer to use in the econometrical estimations the logarithmic 
form of all dependent variables. 
Explanatory variables 
To measure the impact of interbank borrowing on bank risk levels we include as a regressor 
the net interbank position of a bank as measured by the ratio of net interbank assets to total 
assets (NIA/TA). If this ratio has negative values, the bank borrows on the interbank market. 
On the other hand, positive values of the ratio indicate that the bank is a net provider of 
interbank funds. However, a one-stage OLS estimation of the effect of a bank’s net interbank 
position on a bank’s risk may suffer under simultaneity, because as described in the 
theoretical model, the interbank position variable will be an outcome of the same equilibrium 
that determines a bank’s level of risk undertaking. To deal with the simultaneity problem we 
choose to instrument a bank’s net interbank position (NIA/TA) with the lagged net interbank 
position (NIA/TAt-1), a bank’s current ratio of loans to total assets (Loans/TA), and the 
transfer of funds variables (NIA_LB and NIA_SB) based on the ratios of large banks lending 
                                                 
15 see BankScope: “Ratio definitions” 
16  Net charge-offs are defined as the amount written-off from loan-loss reserves minus recoveries (see 
BankScope: “Ratio definitions”) 
  24(NIAlb/CDlb) and small bank borrowing (NIAsb/Lsb)
17, respectively. Each of these instruments 
can be considered as exogenous with respect to current risk, but is correlated with a bank’s 
current interbank position. As expected, lagged net interbank position (NIA/TAt-1) is strongly 
correlated with current interbank position, since interbank borrowing is mainly determined by 
long-term specialization. The ratio of loans to total assets is also strongly correlated with a 
bank’s current interbank position and indicates a banks specialization in credit supply. The 
transfer of funds variables indicate the system average interbank positions of large and small 
banks and are significantly correlated with individual small banks interbank position (see 
Table A4 in the Appendix for the reduced form estimations of NIA/TA). 
In the estimation of the impact of the type of the financial system on bank risk (the model 
defined in equation (14)) we include as regressors the variables measuring the interbank 
transfer of funds, defined in Section 4 as indicators for the existence of a two-tier financial 
intermediation. Thus, the vector TSjt consists of two variables measuring the transfer of funds 
(NIA_LB and NIA_SB) based on the ratios of large banks lending (NIAlb/CDlb) and small 
bank borrowing (NIAsb/Lsb), respectively. A high value of NIA_LB implies that large banks 
have high net interbank assets. A high value of NIA_SB implies that small banks have high 
net interbank assets. Therefore, in two-tier financial intermediation systems, where large 
banks lend and small banks borrow substantial amounts in the interbank market, the values of 
NIA_LB will be high and those of NIA_SB will be low. 
Several control variables are included in the estimations of both econometric models. On the 
individual bank level we introduce bank size, capitalization level and foreign ownership as 
control variables. We proxy a bank’s size by the ratio of its total assets to the median bank 
total assets in the respective sample country. The normalization aims at a better comparability 
across banks with different countries of origin and neutralizes the effects of exchange rate 
deviations. In addition, we use the squared bank size term to control for non-linear form of the 
dependence between bank’s size and risk undertaking. Capitalization is measured by the ratio 
of equity to total assets. Foreign ownership is measured by a dummy variable equal to one if 
at least 50% of a bank’s equity is owned by an institution based abroad and to 0 otherwise. 
We include this variable to account for the possibility that foreign-owned banks have better 
technology for assessment of credit worthiness and are thus less probable to generate non-
performing loans.  
                                                 
17 As illustrated in Table A3 in the Appendix the correlation between NIAlb/CDlb and NIAsb/Lsb is low, that 
allowes us to include both variable as regressors without multicolinearity concerns. 
  25On the level of country of operations we include the following macroeconomic variables as 
controls: inflation, per capita GDP and the rate of GDP
18. Inflation is defined as the 
percentage change in the GDP deflator. Per capita GDP is used as a general index of 
economic development and is measured in thousands of US dollar. GDP growth is used to 
measure cyclical effects on bank risk and is measured as the growth rate of real per capita 
GDP. Time and country fixed effects are introduced in the in the regressions in order to 
capture other unobserved variables. 
5.2. Estimation technique 
As mentioned above in order to deal with the simultaneity of the net interbank position 
variable we estimate the model defined by equation (13) using two-stage least squares. We 
use the instruments to estimate the predicted value of NIA/TA and plug the predicted value of  
NIA/TA into the structural model.  
To correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, which are indicated by diagnostic tests 
(for panel-level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) we estimate the two-stages of the 
model specified by equation (13) using the panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) technique 
as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). The estimations of the impact of the type of financial 
system on the level of bank risk undertaking (the model specified by equation (14)) are 
performed by one-stage PCSE. 
5.3. Estimation results 
In the current subsection we present the results of the empirical analysis of the impact of 
interbank borrowing and the type of the financial intermediation system on the levels of bank 
risk undertaking.  
Table 6 illustrates the results of the regressions of the different proxies for bank risk 
undertaking on the measure of bank’s net interbank position. For all measures of bank risk, 
but the non-performing loans ratio (NPL), the net interbank position of a bank as measured by 
the ratio of net interbank assets to total assets has a significant positive coefficient. The 
coefficient of NIA/TA in the regression using NPL as a proxy for bank risk is also positive 
but statistically insignificant.  
                                                 
18 The usage of these variables as controls for bank risk has been proposed by Demsetz et al (1996) 
  26These results indicate that higher share of net interbank assets in total assets imply higher risk 
levels of the loan portfolio, as measured by the LLR, LLP and lead NCO ratios. Therefore, net 
interbank borrowing, which necessary implies negative net interbank assets is associated with 
lower level of risk undertaking.  Banks borrowing on the interbank market have on average 
lower LLR, LLP, and NCO ratios than banks fully financed through customer deposits.  












net interbank assets/total assets 0.763 *** 1.045 *** 3.579 *** 0.124
0.255 0.361 0.697 0.529
ank size 0.048 ** 0.004 -0.182 0.060 ***
0.020 0.033 0.145 0.019
bank size squared -0.001 -0.001 0.024 * -0.001 ***
0.001 0.002 0.013 0.000
equity/total assets -0.014 *** -0.009 -0.021 * -0.004
0.003 0.007 0.012 0.010
oreign -0.575 *** -0.538 *** -1.062 *** -0.386 **
0.094 0.109 0.249 0.159
flation 0.001 ** 0.000 0.002 -0.001 *
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
per capita GDP -0.320 *** -0.277 * -0.414 0.031
0.093 0.143 0.327 0.141
DP growth -4.778 *** -14.850 *** -5.390 -7.575 ***
1.334 1.682 5.242 2.063
ountry dummies yes yes yes yes
ime dummies yes yes yes yes
R2 0.53 0.77 0.53 0.58
ervations 814 820 181 401
oups 217 239 79 131
LLR LLP LNCO NPL
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
The results of the estimations of the impact of the type of financial intermediation system are 
illustrated in Table 7.  
The level of net interbank assets of small banks (NIA_SB) has a significant positive 
coefficient in all, but the lead NCO, regression specifications. In systems where small banks 
are the providers of interbank funds, the risk levels of the small banks is in general higher 
than in systems where small banks are receivers of interbank funds (have lower net interbank 
assets). Net interbank assets of large banks (NIA_LB) have negative coefficients in all 
specifications, but statistically significant are only those in the regressions using LLR and 
NPL as proxies for bank risk. Therefore, banking systems where large banks are providers of 
interbank funds will be characterized by lower risk levels of the population of small banks. 
These results indicate that in general small banks in two-tier systems, where small banks have 
  27low net interbank assets and large bank have high net interbank assets, have lower levels of 
risk than small banks in one-tier systems.  















net interbank assets LBs (NIA_LB) -0.292 * -0.145 -0.494 -1.010 *
0.178 0.221 1.016 0.591
et interbank assets SBs (NIA_SB) 0.635 *** 0.534 *** 0.383 0.659 ***
0.137 0.202 0.483 0.243
ank size 0.066 *** 0.008 0.044 0.060 ***
0.018 0.018 0.152 0.018
bank size squared -0.001 *** 0.000 0.011 -0.001 ***
0.001 0.001 0.014 0.000
uity/total assets -0.004 -0.004 0.021 -0.003
0.003 0.003 0.013 0.008
oreign -0.617 *** -0.568 *** -0.709 ** -0.452 ***
0.087 0.092 0.286 0.145
inflation 0.000 ** 0.001 * 0.002 -0.002 ***
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
er capita GDP -0.058 -0.073 -0.451 0.150
0.083 0.122 0.346 0.126
DP growth -2.365 ** -9.586 *** -0.199 -6.458 ***
1.051 1.505 4.366 1.998
const 2.480 *** -2.344 ** 0.437 1.500
0.685 0.962 2.981 0.977
ountry dummies yes yes yes yes
time dummies yes yes yes yes
2 0.51 0.75 0.48 0.64
servations 999 1036 214 450
Groups 227 251 85 136
NPL LLR LLP LNCO
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
Control variables 
Bank size has positive significant effect, and bank size squared has negative significant effect 
on LLR and NPL, indicating that the level of bank risk undertaking increases with the size of 
a bank until a critical threshold of relative bank size is overshot. The coefficients of the bank 
size variables are insignificant in the regressions using LLP and lead NCO as risk proxies.  
Equity to total assets has a significant negative impact on LLR and lead NCO, which is 
compliant with the theoretical expectation that banks with higher proportion of own capital 
invest in less risky projects. In the specifications using LLP and NPL as proxy for risk the 
coefficients of equity to total assets are mostly insignificant.  
The foreign ownership dummy has significant negative coefficients in all regression 
specifications, presenting evidence for lower levels of risk undertaking by banks owned by 
  28foreign entities. This result supports similar findings in the literature of foreign bank entry in 
transition and developing countries
19. 
And finally among the macroeconomic variables, higher inflation is associated with higher 
levels of LLR and LLP, indicating that banks reckon with higher risk of their portfolio, in 
high inflation periods. The negative significant coefficients in the NPL regressions indicates 
that de facto loan defaults are lower in high inflation times, which is an intuitive result as long 
as loans have been contracted to pay a fixed interest. Per capita GDP has negative significant 
impact on LLR and LLP indicating lower risk levels of banks in higher income countries, but 
is insignificant in the NCO and NPL regressions. GDP growth significantly reduces bank risk 
as measured by LLR, LLP and NPL indicating the cyclical impact on bank risk.  
To summarize, we find empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that interbank 
borrowing is associated with lower levels of risk undertaking, that is an indicator that 
interbank-borrowing banks are being monitored. This result implies that interbank-lending 
banks feel themselves responsible for losses they incur on interbank transactions and are thus 
monitoring their interbank-debtors in order to control the risk of the investments. 
Furthermore, the estimations of the impact of the type of the financial intermediation system 
indicate that small banks in two-tier financial intermediation systems undertake on average 
lower risk levels than small banks in one-tier financial intermediation systems. In systems 
where funds in the interbank market are provided by large banks, rather than small ones, 
banks undertake less risk on average. Such a result is compliant with our notion that interbank 
monitoring is mostly feasible when few institutions lend large (as relative to monitoring costs) 
amounts, which is mainly the case in two-tier financial intermediation systems. In one-tier 
financial intermediation system, where mostly small banks lend funds in the interbank market, 
monitoring of borrowing banks is not guaranteed, as each lending bank is small relative to the 
borrowing banks. Larger banks borrow from numerous small ones and three problems reduce 
small banks’ incentives to monitor the large borrowing banks. First, the amount of interbank 
lending could be too small in order to justify monitoring costs. Second, free rider problems 
may emerge due to the high number of creditors. And third, if borrowing banks are large 
institutions, governments may be forced to bail them out in case of distress, thus generating 
moral hazard that hampers lending banks’ incentives to monitor.  
                                                 
19 Clarke et al (2003) 
  295.4 Discussion of the results 
The evidence on the interbank monitoring role of incumbent banks has important implications 
for the stability of the banking systems. If it were the case that incumbent banks extend 
credits to other banking institutions without monitoring them it would mean that first, the risk 
of the incumbent banks is higher
20 and second, if funds are channeled through the interbank 
market without controlling for the risk of the borrowing bank, the risk of a system-wide 
contagion through the interbank market would be accelerated.  
We provided the econometric estimations using two-stage least squares to control for the fact 
that the level of risk undertaking and interbank borrowing may be the outcomes of the same 
equilibrium and are thus, according to the introduced theoretical model, simultaneously 
determined variables. An interesting extension of the monitoring issues studied in this paper is 
to prove whether reputation concerns also contribute to the lower risk levels of interbank-
borrowing banks. If reputation is in force banks which have a history of “good behavior” and 
have thus built a positive reputation would be more likely to receive interbank funds than 
banks that have undertaken riskier projects in the past. Whether reputation is in force or not 
would have important implications for the future behavior of new entrants as it creates an 
additional disciplining instrument. 
As an extension to the provided results we test the validity of the reputation hypothesis. 
Keeping in mind that reputation may have become a valid mechanism for reducing the level 
of risk undertaking in a later stage of the transitions (it is possible that in the very early 
transition period reputation is not a reliable mechanism for judging among borrowing banks, 
as it takes time for a bank to accrue a history of prudent behavior), we perform the tests not 
only for the whole observed period but also for different plausible sub-periods. 
To test for the existence of reputation mechanism we look for evidence of whether the amount 
of interbank borrowing in the current period, as measured by the ratio of net interbank assets 
to total assets (NIA/TA),  is significantly influenced by past risk characteristics. As measures 
of previous risk levels we use the lagged values of the risk proxies introduced in 5.1., namely 
LLR, LLP, NCO, and NPL (all in logarithmic form). Since interbank borrowing depends on a 
bank’s specialization and long-term investment in networks, we include the value of the 
lagged net interbank assets to total assets (NIA/TAt-1) as a control variable, when estimating 
the effect of lagged risk characteristics on present interbank borrowing. As a result we have to 
                                                 
20 Implying higher risk for the government to be involved in costly bail-out operations in the future. 
  30estimate a dynamic panel model. We use the technique proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) for the estimations.  
The results of the estimations are illustrated in Tables A5 to A8 of the Appendix. In all 
regression specifications the lagged risk levels have no significant impact on the net interbank 
position. Therefore, current interbank borrowing seems not to be conditional on previous risk. 
This is a rather surprising result that confirms the specific nature of banking in transition 
countries.  
  316. Conclusion 
The paper presents evidence on the risk effects of the strong level of bank specialization in 
some of the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe. The phenomenon we study 
in the paper consists of specialization of the large incumbent banks in deposit gathering 
activities, and of new entrant banks in credit extending.  This phenomenon has been pointed 
out in several descriptive papers, but its effects have not systematically been studied yet. 
A theoretical model based on information asymmetries between a bank and its depositors, 
illustrates that in case of high moral hazard, banks may have incentives to finance risky 
projects even such with negative net present value and indicates the monitoring of bank’s 
activities as a remedy against collapsing of the credit market. As monitoring is costly it can 
not be performed by customer depositors, whose deposits are relatively small as compared to 
monitoring costs. On the other hand, large banks can provide monitoring of the activities of 
their interbank borrowers as the amounts of interbank borrowing are high enough to justify 
the costs. Therefore, banks which partly finance themselves through interbank deposits will 
be characterised by lower levels of risk undertaking as compared to those banks that fully 
finance themselves through customer deposits. 
Using data from banks’ financial statements we construct variables measuring the interbank 
transfer of funds to pick up those of the sample countries where the level of bank 
specialization is so high that we can argue that the banking system consists of two-tiers of 
banks: the banks from one tier gather deposits and channel the funds gathered to the banks 
from the other tier which themselves provide credit to privates. We call these financial 
systems “two-tier financial intermediation” systems. The values of the transfer of funds 
variables suggest the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as “two-tier financial 
intermediation” systems.   
The empirical part of the paper provides econometric evidence on the existence of risk 
alleviating effects of interbank borrowing. We test the impact of interbank borrowing and the 
existence of a two-tier financial intermediation structure on different parameters used as 
proxies for bank’s level of risk undertaking. The results show a significant effect of interbank 
borrowing: banks which borrow on the interbank market undertake less risky projects. 
Furthermore, the results provide empirical evidence on the risk-alleviating impact of the 
existence of two-tier structure: small banks in countries where the large banks are the 
  32providers of interbank funds are characterized by lower risk levels than small banks in 
countries where interbank funds are provided by small banks.  
In general we can argue that the large incumbent banks in some of the CEE countries adopt 
monitoring functions over those of the new entrant banks which finance themselves through 
interbank deposits. In an environment of inefficient banking regulation and undiversified 
portfolios of the new entrant banks, monitoring by the large banks could play essential role 
for the establishment of prudent investment behaviour. Furthermore, the specialization 
phenomenon may be a remedy against collapse of the credit market due to moral hazard.  
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Proof of Proposition 1: 
Assume the large bank can by investing M in monitoring screen the projects that the small 
banks prefer to finance. Then the large bank will require different interest rates on their 
interbank deposits depending on the type of project that is to be financed. If the large bank 
can assure that the small bank will invest in a good project, than it will require an repayment 
of dg. If a bad project will be financed then the required repayment is set at db.  
dgΠG – 1 > 0 > dbΠB –   1         ( 1 A )  
dg < db 
Denote by δ the share of the large bank’s portfolio that is invested in projects been screened 
as “good” and (1- δ) is the share of projects screened as “bad”. Assume the large bank has 
total volume of assets equal to m. Then δm denotes the total volume of investment in good 
projects, whereas (1- δ)m denotes the volume of investment in bad projects. Table A1 
illustrates the net expected return (NER) of the large bank. 
Table A1: Expected return of the large bank 






Probability: 1 - ΠB 
Succeeds 
Probability: ΠG 
All (both good and bad) projects 
succeed 
Probability: ΠGΠB 
NER: (δdg + (1- δ)db – D)m ΠGΠB 
Bad projects fail, good projects 
succeed 
Probability: ΠG(1-ΠB) 
NER: max ((δdg– D)m, 0)ΠG(1-
ΠB) 
Fails 
Probability: 1- ΠG  
Good projects fail, bad projects 
succeed   
All projects fail 
 
  36Probability: (1- ΠG) ΠB 
NER: max ((1- δ)db – D)m, 0)(1- 
ΠG)ΠB  
Probability: (1 – ΠG)(1 – ΠB) 
NER: 0 
Summarizing the information from Table A1, we derive the following expression for the large 
bank’s NER: 
NER = (δdg + (1- δ)db – D)m ΠGΠB + max ((δdg– D)m, 0) ΠG(1-ΠB) + max ((1- δ)db – D)m, 
0) (1- ΠG) ΠB + 0 
The large bank will choose δ so that it maximizes its NER. 
MaxNERδ= (δdg + (1- δ)db – D)m ΠGΠB + max ((δdg– D)m, 0) ΠG(1-ΠB) + max ((1-δ)db– 
D)m, 0) (1- ΠG) ΠB  + 0 
It is trivial that the large bank will be solvent and has to repay D to its depositors if all 
projects succeed. Similarly if all projects fail the bank will have return of 0, no repayment to 
depositors will be made and the banks net return is 0. In the cases where only good/bad 
projects succeed it depends on the relation between δ , dg, db and D whether bank’s returns 
will be sufficient to cover repayments to depositors. The net return in this cases equally the 
return from good(bad) projects net of depositor repayment, and since the bank can repay only 
what it has this net return cannot be negative. To solve the maximization problem we have to 
define the values of max ((δdg– D)m, 0) and max ((δdg– D)m, 0), that is to study whether the 
bank will be solvent if: 
(i)  only the “good” projects succeed: the bank will be solvent ((δdg– D)m > 0) if δ > 
D/dg 
(ii)  only the “bad” projects succeed: the bank will be solvent ((1-δ)db– D)m > 0) if δ < 
1 – D/db 
We constrain the analysis to the case that both dg an db are smaller than 2 (dg < db < 2), 
therefore 1- D/db < D/dg. Then we have to study the following three cases for δ: 
D/dg < δ ≤ 1: In this case the bank is solvent if all projects succeed and if only the good 
projects succeed and is insolvent if only the bad projects succeed. The NER has the following 
form: 
  37NER = (δdg + (1- δ)db – D)m ΠGΠB + (δdg– D)mΠG(1-ΠB) 
The first order condition is:  
∂NER/∂δ = dgΠG – (dbΠB) ΠG, which is always positive, since dgΠG > dbΠB and 0<ΠG<1. 
Therefore, NER is increasing in δ and the local maximum for the interval (D/dg; 1] is at 1.  
(2) 1- D/db ≤ δ ≤ D/dg: In this case the bank is only solvent if all projects succeed. The NER 
has the following form: 
NER = (δdg + (1- δ)db – D)m ΠGΠB  
The first order condition is:  
∂NER/∂δ = dgmΠGΠB – dbmΠGΠB, which is always negative, since dg < db. Therefore NER is 
a decreasing function of δ and the local maximum for the interval [1-D/db; D/ dg] is at 1-D/ db. 
(3) The bank is solvent if all projects succeed and if only the bad projects succeed. The NER 
has the following form: 
NER = (δdg + (1- δ)db – D)m ΠGΠB + ((1-δ)D/db– D)m(1-ΠG)ΠB 
The first order condition is:  
∂NER/∂δ = dgΠGΠB – dbΠB = ΠB(dgΠG – db), which is always negative, since dg < db and 0 < 
ΠG < 1. Therefore, NER is decreasing in δ and the local maximum for the interval [0; 1-D/db] 
is at 0.  
Now it remains to compare the local maximums at the three cases.  
If δ = 1, NER = ΠG(dg – D) 
If δ = 1 – D/db, NER = ΠGΠB(dg – Ddg/db) 
If δ = 0, NER = ΠB(db – D) 
We assume that D < Dc = (ΠGdg – ΠBdb)/(ΠG-ΠB) = Rc – ε, where dg = Rg – ε, and db = Rb – ε. 
Therefore, the NER if δ = 1 (investment only in good projects) is higher than the one in the 
case of δ = 0 (investment only in bad projects). Furthermore, the NER in the case of δ = 1 – 
D/db, that is equal to: 
  38ΠGΠB(dg – Ddg/db) = ΠB (db – D) ΠGdg/db  
which is lower than ΠB (db – D), since ΠGdg/db is lower than 1 (both ΠG and dg/db are in the 
interval (0; 1). Therefore, in order to maximise its net expected return the large bank will 













untry Banks dominating the deposit market
garia up to 1995 only DSK, 1996-2001 DSK and Bulbank
Czech Republic up to1999 only Sporitelna and Komercni,  2000-2001 Sporitelna, Kommercni and Obchodni
tonia up to 1994 Savings and Uhis, 1995-1996 Savings,  Uhis and Hansa, 1997-2001 only Hansa and Uhis
ungary 1994-2001 OTP
Latvia up to 1997 Uni and Parekss,  1998-2001 Uni, Parekss and Hansa
thuania
1994 Commercial and Agricultural, 1995-1996 Commercial, Agricultural and Hansa, 1997-2001 Hansa and 
Vilniaus
Poland 1994-2001 PKO BP
Romania 1994-1997 Bancorex, 1998-2001 Banca Kommerziala
ovakia 1994-2001 Sporitelna and Vseoshta Uverova 
Slovenia 1994 Nova Matibor and Nova Ljubljanska, 1995-2001 only Nova Ljubljanska
 
1) Large banks are the largest banking institutions in terms of gathered customer deposits, each of them 
gathers ≥ 20% of the customer deposits in the respective country and year 
 











Other earning assets 




Non -  earning assets 
Assets  Liabilities & Equity 
Customer & short term  
funding 
Customer deposits 
Inter  - bank deposits 
Other funding 
Reserves (loan loss, etc.) 
Equity 
Loans 
Other earning assets 
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Assets  Liabilities & Equity 









































  41A4. First-stage estimation (NIA/TA on instruments) 
 
lagged net interbank assets/total assets 0.600 ***
0.028
loans/total assets -0.324 ***
0.034
net interbank assets LBs (NIA_LB) 0.014 **
0.007
net interbank assets SBs (NIA_SB) 0.037 *
0.021
bank size 0.006 **
0.003
bank size squared 0.000
0.000






per capita GDP 0.028 **
0.014


















lagged NIA/TA 0.459 *** 0.610 ** 0.400 *** 0.456 *** 0.334 *
0.075 0.254 0.152 0.126 0.208
gged LLP -0.004 -0.019 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
0.007 0.026 0.008 0.016 0.008
bank size  0.002 0.017 0.004 -0.001 0.009
0.006 0.033 0.006 0.013 0.008
bank size squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
uity/total assets 0.004 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.006 *** 0.003 ***
0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
foreign 0.016 (dropped) 0.011 0.098 -0.007
0.035 0.034 0.078 0.037
inflation 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
er capita GDP 0.014 0.128 0.014 0.062 0.019
0.024 0.140 0.024 0.053 0.025
GDP growth -0.474 * -0.033 -0.374 -1.303 ** 0.045
0.243 0.041 0.256 0.511 0.325
const 0.002 -0.023 0.003 -0.014 0.005
0.005 0.041 0.005 0.011 0.007
ime dummies yes yes yes yes yes
observations 653 87 566 194 459
groups 195 87 187 116 161
1998-2001 1994-2001 1994-1996 1997-2001 1994-1997
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively 
 














agged NIA/TA 0.439 *** 0.490 * 0.470 ** 0.525 *** 0.423 *
0.080 0.279 0.199 0.157 0.244
agged LLP 0.002 -0.026 0.006 -0.015 0.010
0.005 0.017 0.006 0.011 0.007
bank size  -0.009 0.016 -0.010 -0.012 0.008
0.006 0.028 0.007 0.014 0.010
ank size squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
uity/total assets 0.006 *** 0.005 * 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.005 ***
0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001
foreign 0.018 (dropped) 0.018 0.091 -0.015
0.042 0.043 0.095 0.048
nflation 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
er capita GDP 0.021 0.140 0.019 0.062 0.019
0.024 0.126 0.025 0.053 0.027
GDP growth -0.473 * -0.273 * -0.354 -1.355 ** 0.030
0.249 0.149 0.272 0.534 0.356
nst 0.002 -0.028 0.014 ** -0.021 -0.034
0.018 0.039 0.006 0.028 0.026
ime dummies yes yes yes yes yes
bservations 591 94 497 205 386
groups 200 94 193 122 164
1998-2001 1994-2001 1994-1996 1997-2001 1994-1997
 
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively 
 














agged NIA/TA 0.227 ** -0.010 0.641 * 0.029
0.117 0.214 0.392 0.449
agged LLP 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.008
0.005 0.005 0.019 0.006
bank size  -0.012 -0.008 0.007 -0.008
0.015 0.015 0.059 0.019
ank size squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
uity/total assets 0.005 *** 0.004 ** 0.009 0.003
0.002 0.002 0.006 0.004
foreign 0.030 0.036 (dropped) 0.031
0.043 0.044 0.049
nflation -0.002 0.000 -0.007 0.000
0.003 0.003 0.010 0.003
er capita GDP -0.007 -0.006 0.066 0.006
0.034 0.033 0.148 0.037
GDP growth 0.026 0.255 -3.550 0.780
0.459 0.456 2.480 0.520
nst -0.038 0.009 -0.026 0.035 *
0.054 0.018 0.052 0.021
ime dummies yes yes yes yes
observations 124 120 20 104
groups 54 53 17 50
1998-2001 1994-2001 1994-1996
 1) 1997-2001 1994-1997
 
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively 
1) Estimation not possible – insufficient number of observations 
 










lagged NIA/TA 0.501 *** 0.624 ** 1.176 ** 1.314
0.188 0.304 0.488 1.278
agged LLP -0.006 -0.008 0.018 -0.026
0.013 0.016 0.041 0.036
bank size  -0.002 -0.002 0.028 -0.005
0.011 0.012 0.048 0.020
bank size squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
uity/total assets 0.005 *** 0.005 ** 0.013 *** 0.003
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004
foreign 0.051 0.064 -0.023 0.175
0.063 0.071 0.105 0.174
inflation 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003
0.003 0.003 0.009 0.006
er capita GDP -0.005 0.004 -0.383 0.038
0.041 0.045 0.192 0.075
GDP growth -0.447 -0.651 -0.353 -0.866
0.479 0.540 1.701 1.113
const 0.001 -0.031 0.102 0.005
0.014 0.037 0.100 0.022
ime dummies yes yes
observations 230 216 41 189
groups 93 92 29 83
1998-2001 1994-2001 1994-1996
1) 1997-2001 1994-1997
Note: Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively 
1) Estimation not possible – insufficient number of observations 
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